From: (b) (6) CDR USN COMTHIRDFLT (USA)

To: CAPT USN COMTHIRDFLT (USA)

Cc: CAPT USN (USA); (b) (6) CAPT USN COMTHIRDFLT (USA); (b) (6) CDR

SN COMTHIRDFLT (USA); (b) (6) LCDR USN COMTHIRDFLT (USA); (b) (6)

SOUTHCOM SC-CC (USA)

Subject: (U) CPF DRAFT UAS REPORTING MSG RFI
Date: Tuesday, May 21, 2019 1:57:01 PM

Attachments: CPF DRAFT UAS REPORTING MESSAGE -14 MAY 1500.docx

#### Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

MOC-D, ALCON.

BLUF: Sir attached is the CPF draft UAS reporting message for C3F review and comments. I have read subj message and have no issues with the content.

V/r,

### CDR (b) (6)

Fleet Security Officer

Antiterrorism Deputy Director (N34D)

Commander THIRD Fleet

**Naval Station Point Loma** 

BLDG C60, RM 323

San Diego, CA 92147

COMM: (b) (6)

DSN: (b) (6)

NIPR: (b) (6) @navy.mil SIPR: (b) (6) @navy.smil.mil

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

P XXXXXXZ MAY 19

FM COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI

TO ALPACFLT

COMSEVENTHFLT

**COMTHIRDFLT** 

**COMNAVMARIANAS GU** 

COMNECCPAC PEARL HARBOR HI

NAVFAC PACIFIC PEARL HARBOR HI

COMNAVREG HAWAII PEARL HARBOR HI

NMCPAC EAST ASIA DIV PEARL HARBOR HI

COMNAVREGCTR SINGAPORE

COMSC PAC SAN DIEGO CA

**COMSC FAR EAST SINGAPORE** 

COMSUBPAC PEARL HARBOR HI

INFO CNO WASHINGTON DC

**HQ USPACOM J3** 

**DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC** 

CTF 134

COMUSFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA

**HQ USNORTHCOM** 

COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA

COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA

COMNAVREGJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA

**COMUSFK SEOUL KOREA** 

COMNAVFORKOREA BUSAN KOR

COMNAVREGKOREA SEOUL KOR

COMNAVSURFPAC SAN DIEGO CA

COMNAVAIRPAC SAN DIEGO CA

COMSUBPAC PEARL HARBOR HI

COMSC NORFOLK VA

COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC

ONI WASHINGTON DC

DIRNAVCRIMINVSERV QUANTICO VA

COGARD MSC WASHINGTON DC

CNIC WASHINGTON DC

COMNAVRESFOR NORFOLK VA

COMSPAWARSYSCOM SAN DIEGO CA

NAVSURFWARCEN DAHLGREN VA

**BUPERS MILLINGTON TN** 

NAVINTACT WASHINGTON DC

NAVY JAG WASHINGTON DC

**BUMED FALLS CHURCH VA** 

COMFLTCYBERCOM FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

COMOPTEVFOR NORFOLK VA

COMNAVSUPSYSCOM MECHANICSBURG PA

COMNAVAIRSYSCOM PATUXENT RIVER MD

COMNAVFACENGCOM WASHINGTON DC

COMNAVSEASYSCOM WASHINGTON DC

COMPACELT PEARL HARBOR HI//

BT

**UNCLASSIFIED FOUO** 

MSGID/GENADMIN/CPF/-/MAY//

SUBJ/(U//FOUO) CONSOLIDATED PACFLT OPERATIONAL REPORTINGREQUIREMENTS OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM (UAS) INCIDENTS FOR

INSTALLATIONS AND AT-SEA UNITS//

REF/A/GENADMIN/COMPACFLT/240100ZJUL18//

REF/B/GENADMIN/COMPACFLT/051933ZDEC17//

REF/C/GENADMIN/COMUSFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA/211900ZJUN16//

REF/D/GENADMIN/COMPACFLT/XXXXXXZMAY19//

REF/E/OPTASK/COMPACFLT/XXXXXXXZMAY19//

REF/F/DOC/OPNAV/-/04OCT2011//

NARR/REF A IS PACFLT OPERATIONAL REPORTING OF UAS INCIDENTS AND FAA NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS BY NAVY INSTALLATIONS, FACILITIES, AND UNITS IN THE PACOM AOR.

REF B IS COMPACFLT MSG SUBJ COUNTER SMALL AIRCRAFT SYSTEM (C-SUAS) GUIDANCE FOR PACFLT AFLOAT UNITS OPERATING IN OR NEAR FOREIGN PORTS. REF C IS USFF/CPF MSG SUBJ OPERATIONAL REPORTING OF UAS ENCOUNTERED BY NAVY INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES.

REF D IS COMPACELT MSG SUBJ PHONE NOTIFICATIONS TO FAA REGARDING UAS ENGAGEMENTS WITHIN THE U.S.

REF E IS COMPACELT OPTASK VISUAL INFORMATION.

REF F IS OPNAVINST F3100.6J NAVY SPECIAL INCIDENT REPORTING PROCEDURES.//

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RMKS/1. (U/FOUO) THIS MESSAGE IS DESIGNED TO CONSOLIDATE UAS REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR BOTH INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES AND AT-SEA UNITS. REFS A AND B ARE CANCELLED. PACFLT PORTION OF REF C IS RESCINDED.//

\_\_\_\_\_\_

2. (U/FOUO) FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (FAA) NOTIFICATION. PARAGRAPH 2 APPLIES TO BOTH INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES AND AT-SEA UNITS OPERATING IN THE UNITED STATES AND TERRITORIES. THE FAA REQUIRES AN IMMEDIATE VOICE NOTIFICATION OF ANY UAS INCIDENT IN THE UNITED STATES AND TERRITORIES THAT INVOLVES THE ENGAGEMENT OF ANY UA WITH INTENT TO DISRUPT OR DISABLE IT, REGARDLESS OF FLIGHT STATUS (I.E. IN FLIGHT, ON GROUND, CAUGHT IN TREE) AND REGARDLESS OF THE COUNTERMEASURE USED. REF D CONTAINS PROCEDURES FOR FAA NOTIFICATIONS.//

\_\_\_\_\_

3. (U/FOUO) VISUAL INFORMATION (VI) REPORTS. PARAGRAPH 3 APPLIES TO BOTH INPORT AND AT-SEA UNITS. VISUAL SIGHTINGS OF A UAS DOES NOT IN AND OF ITSELF MEET VI REPORTING CRITERIA. UNIT COMMANDING OFFICERS, SHIP'S MASTERS, AND MISSION COMMANDERS SHOULD TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE ACTIONS OF THE UAS AND MAKE THE DETERMINATION IF THE INTERACTION MAY HAVE NATIONAL LEVEL INTEREST. REF E CONTAINS PROCEDURE FOR VI REPORTS.//

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4. (U/FOUO) OPREP-3 REPORTING GUIDANCE FOR SMALL UAS (S-UAS)
4.A. (U/FOUO) INPORT/INSTALLATION AND FACILITIES UAS REPORTING.
4.A.1. (U/FOUO) REPORTING OF UAS INPORT/INSTALLATION AND FACILITIES
INCIDENTS WILL FOLLOW REF F OPREP-3 GUIDANCE AND FORMAT FOR VOICE
AND MESSAGE TRAFFIC AS AMPLIFIED BELOW. ALL PACFLT COMMANDS,
INSTALLATIONS, FACILITIES, OUTLYING ACTIVITIES, AND UNITS ARE
DIRECTED TO REPORT ANY CONFIRMED S-UAS ACTIVITY (VALIDATED VIA
VISUAL OBSERVATION AND/OR VERIFIED SENSOR DATA) IN THE VICINITY OF
THEIR UNIT OR WITHIN THE AIRSPACE OVER OR ADJACENT TO THE HOST
INSTALLATION OR FACILITY. IN ORDER TO PREVENT MULTIPLE OPREP-3
REPORTS FOR THE SAME UAS SIGHTING, THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA DETERMINE
REPORTING PROCEDURES:

- 4.A.1.A. UAS OBSERVATIONS IN A NAVY CONTROLLED PORT OR AIRFIELD. SHIPS, SUBMARINES, AND AIRCRAFT SHALL REPORT UAS OBSERVATIONS THAT DO NOT IMPACT THEIR UNIT TO THEIR HOST INSTALLATION IAW INSTALLATION PROCEDURES.
- 4.A.1.B. UAS INTERACTIONS THAT IMPACT A UNIT IN A NAVY CONTROLLED PORT OR AIRFIELD. IF THE UAS HAZARDS, HARASSES OR OTHERWISE IMPACTS YOUR UNIT, REPORT INCIDENT IAW OPREP-3 PROTOCOL AND THIS MESSAGE. ENSURE TO INFO HOST INSTALLATION.
- 4.A.2. (U/FOUO) REPORTING GUIDANCE: THE SCENARIOS BELOW ARE GUIDELINES. COMMANDING OFFICERS SHOULD EVALUATE EACH UAS INCIDENT TO DETERMINE IF HIGHER LEVEL REPORTING IS WARRANTED.
- 4.A.2.A. UAS INCIDENTS REQUIRING REPORTS FALL INTO ONE OF THREE CATEGORIES.
  - (1) OPREP-3 PINNACLE: SHOULD BE SENT AT THE DISCRETION OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER FOR INCIDENTS MEETING PINNACLE THRESHOLD (REF F).
  - (2) OPREP-3 NAVY BLUE: THIS INCLUDES (A) ANY UAS INCIDENT WHERE MEASURES WERE TAKEN, EITHER KINETIC OR NON-KINETIC, TO DISRUPT, DESTROY, OR DISABLE A UAS. (B) ANY UAS INCIDENT WHERE THERE IS A MISSION IMPACT, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER MITIGATION MEASURES WERE TAKEN; (C) ANY UAS INCIDENT THE UNIT, INSTALLATION, OR MISSION COMMANDER DEEMS NECESSARY TO INFORM THE NMCC; (D) ANY UAS INCIDENT THAT MAY GENERATE SIGNIFICANT PRESS INTEREST OR THE INVOLVEMENT OF LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OR OTHER OUTSIDE-THE-UNIT OR INSTALLATION ENTITIES.
  - (3) OPREP-3 NAVY UNIT SITREP: ANY CONFIRMED UAS SIGHTING OR DETECTION OVER OR ADJACENT TO A SHIP, SUBMARINE, AIRCRAFT, UNIT, INSTALLATION, FACILITY OR ASSET, REGARDLESS OF MISSION ACTIVITY AT THE TIME OR SIGHTING. (SEE NAVY CONTROLLED PORT / HOMEPORT- CAVEAT PARA 4.A.1.A ABOVE).
- 4.A.2.B. (U/FOUO) REPORT FORMAT / INFORMATION REQUIRED: REF F DOES NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS UAS INCIDENTS, OTHER THAN AS DIRECT SURVEILLANCE INCIDENTS. UNTIL A CHANGE TO REF F IS RELEASED, INITIAL MESSAGE REPORTING FOR INPORT/INSTALLATION AND FACILITIES

EVENTS (OPREP-3 PINNACLE, NAVY BLUE, OR NAVY UNIT SITREP) SHALL INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

LINE 1 - DTG OF INCIDENT

LINE 2 - LOCATION OF INCIDENT: MILITARY GRID REFERENCE SYSTEM (MGRS) AND DESCRIPTION (I.E., VICINITY POST EXCHANGE, AIRFIELD, HOUSING AREA, ETC.)

LINE 3 - SUAS OBSERVATION SOURCE: IF REPORTED BY SUBORDINATE UNIT, INCLUDE THE UNITS INFORMATION. IF GENERATED FROM OPERATIONAL OR INTELLIGENCE REPORTING, LIST REPORT SERIAL NUMBER OR OTHER IDENTIFYING INFORMATION (SERIAL NUMBER, DATE-TIME GROUP OF MESSAGE, ETC.).

LINE 4 - NUMBER OF SUAS: IF ONE OBSERVATION WITH MULTIPLE DEVICES, DESIGNATE EACH DEVICE AS UAS-1, UAS-2, UAS-3, ETC, THROUGH THE REMAINDER OF THE REPORT. ENSURE MULTIPLE UAS OBSERVED ARE DISTINCT AND NOT THE SAME UAS BEING REPORTED BY MULTIPLE OBSERVERS. LINE 5 - SUAS TYPE (DESCRIPTION): TYPE: (ROTOR - QUADCOPTER, FIXED WING, OTHER, UNKNOWN). DESCRIPTION: (COLOR(S), MARKINGS [DECALS, STRIPES, LINES], LIGHTS [NUMBER, COLOR, POSITION ON DEVICE], PAYLOAD [CAMERA, SENSOR, OTHER DEVICES]).

LINE 6 - SUAS FLIGHT DETAILS (DESCRIPTION): DIRECTION (FROM AND TOWARD), SPEED (SLOW, MODERATE, FAST, VERY FAST), ALTITUDE (APPROXIMATE IN METERS), BEHAVIOR (TRAVELING, HOVERING, FOLLOWING). LINE 7 - PERCEIVED SUAS INTENT: SURVEILLANCE, RECREATIONAL, NUISANCE, PROFESSIONAL CIVILIAN USE, PHYSICAL ATTACK, OTHER (DESCRIBE), UNKNOWN.

LINE 8 - IDENTIFICATION OF SUAS OPERATORS: NUMBER, LOCATION, (DESCRIPTION) OR UNKNOWN.

LINE 9 - C-UAS SYSTEMS ON-HAND: YES (NUMBER / TYPE) OR NONE. LINE 10 - C-UAS SYSTEMS EMPLOYED IAW ROE: YES (NUMBER, TYPE), NO (EXPLAIN WHY NOT USED).

LINE 10A - C-UAS EMPLOYMENT RESULTS: UAS FLIGHT DISRUPTED (DESCRIBE, IE. DEVICE DEPARTED AREA), UAS FLIGHT TERMINATED (DESCRIBE, I.E. DEVICE LANDED, CRASHED), NO OBSERVED EFFECT ON DEVICE, UNKNOWN.

LINE 10B - SUAS RECOVERY / DISPOSITION: COMPLETE IF UAS FLIGHT TERMINATED. YES: (INCLUDE DEVICE CONDITION, CURRENT LOCATION, WHO HAS CUSTODY, ETC.) OR NO: (EXPLAIN WHY NOT RECOVERED AND LOCATION OF FLIGHT TERMINATION).

LINE 11 - TOTAL ELAPSED TIME OF INCIDENT: LIST THE TIME IN MINUTES OF THE OVERALL INCIDENT (I.E. 1 HOUR AND 5 MINUTES = 65).

LINE 12 - EXTERNAL COORDINATION / NOTIFICATIONS CONDUCTED: ORGANIZATIONS OR UNITS WITH DTG (IE. FAA, HOST NATION THROUGH COUNTRY TEAM, USFK OR USFJ, LAW ENFORCEMENT [CID, NCIS, AFOSI, CGIS]).

LINE 13 - REPORTING ORGANIZATION POC: NAME/RANK, POSITION, ORGANIZATION, PHONE NUMBER, EMAIL ADDRESS (SIPR AND NIPR).
4.A.2.C. (U) STORYBOARD REQUIREMENTS: A STORYBOARD IS A GRAPHIC REPRESENTATION OF AN INCIDENT AND IS GENERALLY DEPICTED ON A

POWERPOINT SLIDE. WITHIN 12 HOURS AFTER THE COMPLETION OF AN INCIDENT, UNITS SHALL PROVIDE A STORYBOARD TO PROVIDE GREATER DETAIL ON THE EVENT. A SINGLE SLIDE IS TYPICAL, BUT MULTIPLE SLIDES MAY BE USED FOR EXTENDED OR COMPLEX EVENTS. AT A MINIMUM, STORYBOARDS SHALL INCLUDE A MAP BACKGROUND, AN INSET MAP SHOWING THE AREA COVERED BY THE MAIN MAP, A NORTH ARROW, A NUMBERED DISTANCE SCALE, WEATHER, AND A UNIT CO OR WARFARE COMMANDER'S COMMENT CHARACTERIZING THE BEHAVIOR OF THE FOREIGN ENTITIES AND LEVEL OF PERCEIVED THREAT. IN ADDITION, STORYBOARDS SHOULD INCLUDE DESCRIPTIVE IMAGES OF THE ACTIVITY IF SPACE IS AVAILABLE. MULTIPLE REPORTABLE EVENTS (I.E. DURING A FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION OPERATION) CAN BE REPRESENTED BY A SINGLE MISSION STORYBOARD. STORYBOARDS SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED IF THEY REVEAL PPRS, TACTICS, OR INDICATIONS AND WARNING. VERSIONS UP TO TS/SCI CAN BE PRODUCED IF USEFUL FOR CONVEYING ALL CONTEXT. PROPERLY MARK THE CLASSIFICATION OF EACH IMAGE AND TEXT ANNOTATION IN THE SLIDE.

- 4.A.2.C.1. (U) THERE IS NO NEED TO DUPLICATE WORK, AND A STORYBOARD PRODUCED AS A VI PRODUCT (PARA 3 ABOVE) WILL MEET THE OPREP-3 STORYBOARD REQUIREMENT. DO NOT NEED TO CREATE A STORYBOARD FOR VI AND A SEPARATE STORYBOARD TO ACCOMPANY THE OPREP-3 REPORT. 4.A.2.C.2. (U) PACFLT MOC MAY NEED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AFTER RECEIPT OF THE STORYBOARD, THEREFORE THE REPORTING COMMAND MUST BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE A DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF THE INCIDENT. 4.B. (U/FOUO) AT-SEA UAS REPORTING (INTERNATIONAL WATERS) 4.B.1. (U/FOUO) REPORTING OF UAS INCIDENTS AT SEA WILL FOLLOW REF F OPREP-3 GUIDANCE AND FORMAT FOR VOICE AND MESSAGE TRAFFIC AS AMPLIFIED BELOW. ALL PACFLT UNITS AT-SEA ARE DIRECTED TO REPORT ANY CONFIRMED S-UAS ACTIVITY IN THE VICINITY OF THEIR UNIT. 4.B.2. (U/FOUO) REPORTING GUIDANCE: THE SCENARIOS BELOW ARE GUIDELINES. COMMANDING OFFICERS SHOULD EVALUATE EACH S-UAS INCIDENT TO DETERMINE IF HIGHER LEVEL REPORTING IS WARRANTED. 4.B.2.A. UAS INCIDENTS REQUIRING REPORTS FALL INTO ONE OF THREE CATEGORIES.
  - (1) OPREP-3 PINNACLE: SHOULD BE SENT AT THE DISCRETION OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER FOR INCIDENTS MEETING PINNACLE THRESHOLD (REF F).
  - (2) OPREP-3 NAVY BLUE: THIS INCLUDES (A) ANY UAS INCIDENT WHERE MEASURES WERE TAKEN, EITHER KINETIC OR NON-KINETIC, TO DIRSRUPT, DESTROY, OR DISABLE A UAS, (B)ANY UAS INCIDENT WHERE THERE IS A MISSION IMPACT, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER MITIGATION MEASURES WERE TAKEN; (C) ANY UAS INCIDENT THE UNIT DEEMS NECESSARY TO INFORM THE NMCC; (D) ANY UAS INCIDENT THAT MAY GENERATE SIGNIFICANT PRESS INTEREST.

    (3) OPREP-3 NAVY UNIT SITREP: ANY CONFIRMED UAS SIGHTING OR DETECTION NEAR AN AFLOAT UNIT.
- 4.B.2.B. (U) REPORT FORMAT / INFORMATION REQUIRED: SAME AS 4.A.2.B.
- 4.B.2.C. (U) STORYBOARD REQUIREMENTS: SAME AS 4.A.2.C.
- 4.B.3. (U) SPY DATA TAPES: SEND SPY DATA TAPES TO NAVAL SURFACE

WARFARE CENTER DETACHMENT DAHLGREN (NSWCDD) AS SOON AS OPERATIONALLY FEASIBLE FOR ANALYSIS. DIRLAUTH WITH NSWCDD IS AUTHORIZED. EMAIL: DLGR NSWC REACHBACK(AT)NAVY.SMIL.MIL.

4.B.3.A. ADDRESS OUTER PACKAGING TO:

NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER DAHLGREN

PROCESSING CENTER

6146 TISDALE RD, SUITE 237

DAHLGREN, VA 22448-5158

4.B.3.B. ADDRESS INNER PACKAGING TO:

NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER DAHLGREN

ATTN: ROB WARD, NSWCDD 6146 TISDALE RD, SUITE 237 DAHLGREN, VA 22448-5158//

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5. (U/FOUO) SECURITY/CLASSIFICATION: COMPILING THE UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN A REPORT MAY MAKE THE MESSAGE CLASSIFIED. FOR THOSE WITH UNCLASS XMIT CAPABILITY ONLY - IF ANY INFORMATION REQUIRED IN NOTIFICATION AND REPORTING PROCEDURES EXCEEDS THE CLASSIFICATION ALLOWED BY TRANSMISSION MODE, STATE INFORMATION EXCEEDS THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE TRANSMISSION MODE - ON FILE WITH THE REQUESTOR NEXT TO THE APPROPRIATE PARAGRAPH, AND FOLLOW UP AS APPLICABLE TO SUPPORT REQUIRED INFORMATION SHARING.//

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6. (U) POINTS OF CONTACT.
6.A. CPF BATTLE WATCH CAPTAIN (BWC): NIPR EMAIL:
CPF.CATBWC(AT)NAVY.MIL SIPR EMAIL: CPF.CATBWC.FCT
(AT)NAVY.SMIL.MIL (DSN) (b) (6)
                                   (COMM) (b)
6.B. CPF C-UAS AT/FP POC (LCDR (b) (6)
                                      NIPR EMAIL:
            (AT)NAVY.MIL SIPR EMAIL: (b) (6)
                                   (COMM) (b
(AT)NAVY.SMIL.MIL (DSN) (b) (6)
6.C. CPF SUAS REPORTING GUIDANCE POC (MR. (b)
NIPR EMAIL: (b) (6)
                        (AT)NAVY.MIL SIPR EMAIL:
              (AT)NAVY.SMIL.MIL (DSN) (b) (6
(b) (6)
(COMM) (b) (6)
ВТ
```

From: C3F BWC

To: VADM USN COMTHIRDFLT (USA)

Cc:

C3F All Front Office; C3F Surgeon; C3F JAG; C3F FOPS; C3F COPS; C3F All ACOS & SA & Deputies; CPF.CATBWC; (b) (6) LCDR USN COMTHIRDFLT (USA); (b) (6) LCDR USN COMTHIRDFLT CDR USN (USA); (b) CAPT USN (USA);

LCDR USN (USA) WITHIRDFLT (USA);

(U) GBG UAS interaction \*\*Corrected Email Subject:

Date: Thursday, July 25, 2019 6:32:54 AM

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

#### Admiral,

BLUF: GBG Operating 10NM S of San Clemente Island when 4 UAV's were identified proceeding inbound and orbiting around USS Gabrielle Giffords, while conducting MQ8 Flight OPS. GBG Landed, refueled, and re-launched MQ-8 to investigate small UAS and try to determine small UAS point of origin. Three small boats were in the vicinity, two unidentified and one Identified as Pez Ezpada. GBG queried Pre Ezpada with no response. Awaiting release of NUS.

Very Respectfully,

LCDR (b) (6) C3F Battle Watch Captain C3F\_BWC.FCT@navy.smil.mil

C3F\_BWC.FCT@navy.mil

Comm: VoSIP:

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

From: (b) (6) <u>ISC DDG60</u>

To: CDR USN COMTHIRDFLT (USA); C3F BWC; C3F COPS; C3F ABWC;

 CCSG9 N2@ccsg9.navy.smil.mil;
 (b) (6)
 CAPT USN COMNAVSURFPAC SAN (USA);

 (b) (6)
 navy.smil.mil; (b) (6)
 CAPT USN COMDESROM 23 (USA);

 (b) (6)
 navy.smil.mil; (b) (6)
 LT USN (USA);

 (b) (6)
 LT USN (USA);

CPF.CATBWC; cpf.catpao

Cc: "TAO@cg52.navy.smil.mil"; '(b) (6) smil.mil"; '(b) (6) smil.mil"; "SIO@cg52.navy.smil.mil";

[ha6.navy.smil.mil.; (b) (6) @lha6.navy.smil.mil"; ATO; CO; Combat Systems Khaki;

<u>OPS; PTO; TAO; XO</u>

Subject: (U) USS PAUL HAMILTON/VIR/CHINA/MV BASS STRAIT/150511ZJUL19

Date: Monday, July 15, 2019 4:31:25 AM

Attachments: 150511ZJUL19.MV BASS STRAIT.PHM.001.UNCLAS.jpg

150511ZJUL19.MV BASS STRAIT.PHM.QUICKLOOK STORYBOARD.UNCLAS.pptx

150511ZJUL19.MV BASS STRAIT.PHM.001.UNCLAS.mp4 150511ZJUL19.MV BASS STRAIT.PHM.001.UNCLAS.jpg 150511ZJUL19.MV BASS STRAIT.PHM.003.UNCLAS.JPG.jpg

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

 (U) Attached is VI from USS PAUL HAMILTON. Amplifying information: Interaction with HONG KONG flagged Merchant Vessel BASS STRAIT likely operating UAVs.

- 2. (U) Units involved: USS PAUL HAMILTON (DDG-60); M/V BASS STRAIT.
- 3. (U) Files attached: STORYBOARD; 2X JPEG; 1X VIDEO.

150511ZJUL19.MV BASS STRAIT.PHM.001.UNCLAS.JPG

150511ZJUL19.MV BASS STRAIT.PHM.002.UNCLAS.JPG

150511ZJUL19.MV BASS STRAIT.PHM.003.UNCLAS.JPG

150511ZJUL19.MV BASS STRAIT.PHM.001.UNCLAS.MP4

150511ZJUL19.MV BASS STRAIT.PHM.QUICKLOOK STORYBOARD.UNCLAS.PPTX 4.

(U) USS PAUL HAMILTON is in international waters approximately 70 NM E of San Clemente Island, CA.

- 5. (U) LATITUDE/LONGITUDE: 3256160N 11949875W.
- 6. (U) DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT:

0511Z: SNOOPIE Team called away for VOI MV BASS STRAIT approximately 6200YDS from PHM. MV BASS

STRAIT's course was 058T at 06KTS.

0545Z: UAV was 048T from PHM

0554Z: 3x UAV were 266T astern from PHM

0556Z: UAV was 355T from PHM

0600Z: UAV was 082T from PHM

0602Z: UAV was near PHM's STBD bow

0624Z: UAV was PORT QTR moving to Starboard

0631Z: UAV was 280T 2NM astern from PHM

0639Z: 3x drones on near STBD QTR

0646Z: All UAVs headed toward TR

0650Z: UAV off STBD QTR

0652Z: UAV off PORT QTR

0659Z: 2x UAVs at 124T, ALT 1400ft; 4x UAVs off PORT QTR 0900Z: CO declared VI event complete and secured SNOOPIE Team

Nothing further to report. No impact to PHM's mission.

Very respectfully, ISC(IW/SW/EXW) (b) (6) USS Paul Hamilton (DDG-60) Ship's IDIS Classification: UNCLASSIFIED






### **UNCLASSIFIED**

#### 15 JUL 19: MV BASS STRAIT




<u>BLUF</u>: (U) USS PAUL HAMILTON (PHM) conducting routine operations in the SOCAL OPAREA observed MV BASS STRAIT likely using UAVs to conduct surveillance on US Naval Forces while transiting to scheduled port of call, Long Beach, CA.


#### USS PHM MV BASS STRAIT











#### **Timeline of Events**

- 0511Z: SNOOPIE Team called away for VOI MV BASS STRAIT approximately 6200YDS from PHM. MV BASS STRAIT's course was 058T at 06KTS
- 2. 0545Z: UAV was 048T from PHM
- 3. 0554Z: 3x UAV were 266T astern from PHM.
- 4. 0556Z: UAV was 355T from PHM
- 5. 0600Z: UAV was 082T from PHM
- 6. 0602Z: UAV was near PHM's STBD bow
- 7. 0624Z: UAV was PORT QTR moving to Starboard
- 8. 0631Z: UAV was 280T 2NM astern from PHM
- 9. 0639Z: 3x drones on near STBD QTR
- 10.0646Z: All UAVs headed toward TR
- 11.0650Z: UAV off STBD QTR
- 12.0652Z: UAV off PORT QTR
- 13.0659Z: 2x UAVs at 124T, ALT 1400ft; 4x UAVs off PORT QTR
- 14.0900Z: CO declared VI event complete and secured SNOOPIE

Team

★ Video/Photos capture point(s)

8000YDS

**Distance Scale** 

UNCLASSIFIED

Current as of 150900ZJUL19





From: (b) (6) LT IWO (DDG 1000)

To: C3F\_BWC; C3F\_ABWC; C3F\_COPS; (b) (6) CDR\_COMTHIRDFLT; "CCSG9\_N2@ccsg9.navy.smil.mil";

(6) @cvn71.navy.smil.mil\*; (b) (6) CAPT CDS-23, N00; (b) (

DÚRE, NOT; (b) (6) ECÚR COMDESRON 23, N2

Cc: (b) (6) CAPT CO (DDG 1000); (b) (6) CAPT XO (DDG 1000); DDG1000 TAO; DDG1000

SMCWO; (b) (6) CTTCS (DDG 1000); (b) (6) (DDG 1000)

Subject: (U) USSZUMWALT/VIR/UNK/APPROACH/240330ZAPR19

Date: Tuesday, April 23, 2019 10:49:19 PM

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

BWC,

1. (U) Attached is VI from USS ZUMWALT. Amplifying information: ZUM CO reporting interaction with up to 6x UAS operating at various altitudes between 300-1000 ft. All appeared to fly consistent pattern, NW, East, South, without alteration of course speed, or altitude.

CO intends to provide additional footage once back in homeport SD in accordance with UAS AT SEA REPORTING GUIDANCE FOR C3F UNITS IN PACIFIC FLEET THEATHER OF OPERATIONS (DTG 110007ZJAN19).


- 2. (U) Units involved: USS ZUMWALT and up to 6x UNK UAS
- 3. (U) Files attached: 2x .JPEG, 1x .WMV, QUICKLOOK, PAO Statement
- 4. (U) Ship name and geographic reference: USS ZUMWALT in INTERNATIONAL waters approximately 13 miles off the coast of CAMP PENDELTON, CA.
- 5. (U) LATITUDE/LONGITUDE: 3301N 11735W
- 6. (U) DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT:
- (U) At approximately 0330Z on 24 April 2019, multiple UAS conducted consistent, repeated flight pattern that intersected ZUM track while it was conducting

routine operations in INTERNATIONAL waters in the SOCAL OPAREA, 13 NM west of CAMP PENDLETON. No personnel observed and no weapons visible. Confirmed two (2) overflight intercepts with no deviation to course, speed, or altitude at time of intercept.

(U) During the incident, at 0315Z: Gained visual of 1x UNK flashing lights off starboard bow, BRG 340R, position angle 3. At 0325Z: CO notified of 3 lights identified (steady white) at 030R. At 0330Z: ZUM identified two sets of flashing red/green lights and JOOD determined by shape and light position that lights were consistent with a UAS. At 0333Z: CO on bridge. Starboard lookout reports drone crosses flight deck from starboard to port. Port lookout confirms visual of lights and reports heading away. At 0335Z-0440Z: SNOOPIE Team continues to track multiple, up to 6x, UAS systems heading Northwest and Southeast. At 0440Z: CO called the event and continued to track UAS'. End of event.

V/R.

LT(b) (6) IWO, USS ZUMWALT (DDG 1000)



Classification: UNCLASSIFIED


# THE BEAUTY OF SEAL OF

#### UNCLASSIFIED

# 21 JUL 19: USS PAUL HAMILTON OBSERVES UAS



<u>BLUF</u>: (U) USS PAUL HAMILTON (PHM) conducting routine operations in the SOCAL OPAREA observes 3 UAS approximately 4NM off the starboard stern. CO assesses interaction as no threat to O/S and likely local fisherman operating personal quadcopters. No impact to PHM's mission.



#### **Timeline of Events**

- 0220Z: Indications of UAS at 5-8NM from PHM starboard bow. One UNK vessel on course 270T at 6KTS. PHM on course 306T at 5KTS. Bridge VID 1 UAS on course 090T at over 5NM, but unable to capture photograph.
- 0225Z: SNOOPIE Team called away. SNOOPIE Team unable to gain visual of 1 UAS on course 090T at over 5NM. UNK vessel turns course to match PHM's course of 306T.
- 0235Z: UNK vessel goes DIW. 2 UAS observed at approximately 4-5NM hovering over UNK vessel. SNOOPIE Team was able to capture photos but no video due to distance of UAS.
- 4. 0320Z: UNK vessel and UAS out of sight. SNOOPIE Team is secured.

**USS PAUL HAMILTON** 

UNCLASSIFIED

Current as of 210320ZJUL19










# 24 APR 19: ZUM Interaction with MULTIPLE UNK UAS

<u>BLUF</u>: ZUM CO reporting interaction with up to 6x UAS operating at various altitudes between 300-1000 ft. All appeared to fly consistent pattern, NW, East, South, without alteration of course speed, or altitude.



### **Timeline of Events**

- **1. 0315Z:** Gained visual of 1x UNK flashing lights off starboard bow, BRG 340R, position angle 3.
- 0325Z: CO notified of 3 lights identified (steady white) at 030R.
- 0330Z: ZUM identified two sets of flashing red/green lights and JOOD determined by shape and light position that lights were consistent with a UAS.
- 4. 0333Z: CO on bridge. Starboard lookout reports drone crosses flight deck from starboard to port. Port lookout confirms visual of lights and reports heading away.
- 0335Z-0440Z: SNOOPIE Team continues to track multiple, up to 6x, UAS systems heading Northwest and Southeast.
- 6. 0440Z: CO called the event and continued to track UAS'. End of event.

Current as of 240500Z APR 2019



Video/Photos capture point(s)

At approximately 0510Z on 30MAR19, 8x unknown UAS' operated in the vicinity of USS HARPERS FERRY while it was conducting routine operations in international waters in the SoCal OPAREA flying directly over USS HARPERS FERRY at low altitude of approximately 500 feet.

During the incident, USS HARPERS FERRY identified 8x unknown aircraft flying in the vicinity of USS HARPERS FERRY. The unknown UASs were likely conducting collection operations on USS HARPERS FERRY. Three of the eight UAS' flew over USS HARPERS FERRY at a low altitude of approximately 500 feet. At approximately 0623Z, the multiple UAS' were no longer in visual and likely concluded collection operations on USS HARPERS FERRY.

U.S. Navy ships and aircraft operate throughout the Indo-Pacific routinely, including in the East China Sea. As we have for decades, our forces will continue to fly, sail and operate anywhere international law allows. We expect all regional navies and the forces under their control to behave safely and professionally at all times. On rare occasions when interactions are unsafe and/or unprofessional, we have mechanisms to examine those incidents.

#### UNCLASSIFIED

# 30 MAR 19: HFY Interactions with UNK UAS'

**CO's Comment**: HFY was flown over three times by three different an unknown UAS' creating a dangerous situation.

# (U) Unknown UAS USS HARPERS FERRY Unknown UAS' Video/Photos capture point(s) **Distance Scale** 1,000FT 3238N 11754W

#### **Timeline of Events**

- 0510Z: HFY SNOOPIE Team called away port side. 8x unknown UAS' operated in vicinity of HFY. HFY on CSE 060T at 12kts operating 21NM west of Camp Pendleton.
- 0515Z: 3 of the 8 unknown UAS' flew directly over HFY. No personnel and no weapons were observed on the wings of the unknown UAS'. HFY on CSE 060T at 12kts
- 0528Z: Multiple unknown UAS' continued operating in vicinity of HFY. HFY on CSE 060T at 5kts.
- 0536Z: Multiple unknown UAS' continued operating in vicinity of HFY. HFY on CSE 060T at 5kts.
- 5. 0623Z: HFY SNOOPIE Team secured.

From: CDR USN COMTHIRDFLT (USA)

To: (b) (6) CAPT USN COMTHIRDFLT (USA); (b) (6) CAPT USN (USA)

Cc: (b) (6) CAPT USN COMTHIRDFLT (USA); (b) (6) CAPT USN COMNAVSURFPAC (USA); (b) (6) CAPT USN COMTHIRDFLT (USA); (b) (6) CAPT USN COMTHIRDFLT (USA); (b) (6) CDR USN COMTHIRDFLT (USA); (b) (6) CDR USN COMTHIRDFLT (USA); (b) (6)

tcur usn comthirdelt (usa); (b) (6)

(b) (6) CDR USN SOUTHCOM SC-cc (usa); (b) (6)

SCPO USN (USA); (b) (6)

SCPO USN (USA); (b) (6)

COMTHIRDFLT (USA)

Subject: FW: (U) DoD Mobile Asset C-UAS Authorization checklist

Date: Thursday, May 30, 2019 9:44:28 AM

Attachments: GENADMIN DoD Checklist for the Use of C-UAS Capabilities Mobile Covered....pdf

#### Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

MOC-D, ALCON, FYSA.

BLUF: DoD Checklist for the use of C-UAS Capabilities is provided for everyone's situational awareness.

V/r,

CDR (b) (6)

Fleet Security Officer

Antiterrorism Deputy Director (N34D)

Commander THIRD Fleet

**Naval Station Point Loma** 

BLDG C60, RM 323

San Diego, CA 92147

COMM: (b) (6)

DSN: (b) (6)

NIPR: (b) (6) @navy.mil SIPR: (b) (6) @navy.smil.mil

From: (b) (6) CTR USN USFFC (USA) < (b) (6) .ctr@navy.smil.mil>

Sent: Thursday, May 30, 2019 8:45 AM

To: (b) (6) CDR USN COMTHIRDFLT (USA) < (b) (6) @navy.smil.mil>

Subject: DoD Mobile Asset C-UAS Authorization checklist

Bobby,

Attached is the DoD Mobile checklist.

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

**T-Solutions** 

(b) (6)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

AMHS 4.1.5.3 4.1.5.3 Page 1 of 5

#### **UNCLAS FOUO**

# DOD CHECKLIST: C-UAS CAPABILITIES: MOBILE COVERED ASSETS WITHIN

Originator: JOINT STAFF J3 WASHINGTON DC

DTG: 101350Z Jan 19 Precedence: R DAC: General

To: OSD ASD HOMELAND DEF AND GLOBAL SEC WASHINGTON DC, HQDA CSA WASHINGTON DC, CSAF WASHINGTON DC, CMC ACMC WASHINGTON DC, CMC WASHINGTON DC, CMC WASHINGTON DC, CDR NORAD PETERSON AFB CO, CDR NORAD PETERSON AFB CO, DCDR NORAD PETERSON AFB CO, DCDR NORAD PETERSON AFB CO, HQ NORAD PETERSON AFB CO, HQ NORAD PETERSON AFB CO, HQ NORAD-USNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB CO, HQ NORAD-USNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB CO, NORAD J3 PETERSON AFB CO, NORAD J3 PETERSON AFB CO, USNORTHCOM J3 PETERSON AFB CO, USNORTHCOM J3 PETERSON AFB CO, CDR USNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB CO, CDR USNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB CO, COMBATANT CDR USNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB CO, COMBATANT CDR USNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB CO, HQ USNORTHCOM, HQ USNORTHCOM, NORAD AND USNORTHCOM COMMAND CENTER PETERSON AFB CO, NORAD AND USNORTHCOM COMMAND CENTER PETERSON AFB CO, CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI, DCDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI, HQ USPACOM J3, CDR USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE, DCDR USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE, DCDR USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE, USSTRATCOM J3 DIR GLOBAL OPS OFFUTT AFB NE, JOINT STAFF J3 ANTI-TERRORISM DIV WASHINGTON DC, JOINT STAFF J3 DEP-DIR ATHD WASHINGTON DC, JOINT STAFF J3 DEP-DIR GLOBAL OPS WASHINGTON DC, JOINT STAFF J3 DEP-DIR REGIONAL OPS WASHINGTON DC. JOINT STAFF J3 JOINT OPS DIV WASHINGTON DC. JOINT STAFF J3 NMCC OPS WASHINGTON DC, JOINT STAFF J3 WASHINGTON DC, JOINT STAFF J8 WASHINGTON DC

Attachment 1 DoD Checklist for the Use of C-UAS Capabilities\_ Mobile Covered Assets v25 cao 14 Dec 18.pdf

RAAUZATZ RUEKJCS1239 0101352-UUUU--RUEKJCS RUIPAAA. ZNR UUUUU R 101350Z JAN 19 FM JOINT STAFF J3 WASHINGTON DC TO RUEKJCS/OSD ASD HOMELAND DEF AND GLOBAL SEC WASHINGTON DC RUEADWD/HQDA CSA WASHINGTON DC RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC RUJIAAA/CMC ACMC WASHINGTON DC RUJIAAA/CMC CMC WASHINGTON DC RUJIAAA/CMC WASHINGTON DC RUJCAAA/CDR NORAD PETERSON AFB CO RUIFAAA/CDR NORAD PETERSON AFB CO RUJCAAA/DCDR NORAD PETERSON AFB CO RUIFAAA/DCDR NORAD PETERSON AFB CO RUJCAAA/HQ NORAD PETERSON AFB CO RUIFAAA/HQ NORAD PETERSON AFB CO RUJCAAA/HQ NORAD-USNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB CO RUIFAAA/HQ NORAD-USNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB CO RUJCAAA/NORAD J3 PETERSON AFB CO RUIFAAA/NORAD J3 PETERSON AFB CO RUJCAAA/USNORTHCOM J3 PETERSON AFB CO RUIFAAA/USNORTHCOM J3 PETERSON AFB CO RUJCAAA/CDR USNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB CO RUIFAAA/CDR USNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB CO RUJCAAA/COMBATANT CDR USNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB CO RUIFAAA/COMBATANT CDR USNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB CO RUJCAAA/HQ USNORTHCOM RUIFAAA/HQ USNORTHCOM RUJCAAA/NORAD AND USNORTHCOM COMMAND CENTER PETERSON AFB CO RUIFAAA/NORAD AND USNORTHCOM COMMAND CENTER PETERSON AFB CO RUICAAA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI RUICAAA/DCDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI RUICAAA/HO USPACOM J3 RUIPAAA/CDR USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE

RUIPAAA/DCDR USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE

RULWAAA/DCDR USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE RUIPAAA/USSTRATCOM J3 DIR GLOBAL OPS OFFUTT AFB NE RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF J3 ANTI-TERRORISM DIV WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF J3 DEP-DIR ATHD WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF J3 DEP-DIR GLOBAL OPS WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF J3 DEP-DIR REGIONAL OPS WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF J3 JOINT OPS DIV WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF J3 NMCC OPS WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF J3 WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF J8 WASHINGTON DC ZEN/OSD ASD HOMELAND DEFENSE AND GLOBAL SECURITY ZEN/CDR USSTRATCOM ABNCP OFFUTT AFB NE ZEN/CNO WASHINGTON DC ZEN/CSA JSP WASHINGTON DC ZEN/USCGC WASHINGTON ZEN/COMSUBPAC REP PACNORWEST BANGOR WA ZEN/COMFLTCYBERCOM FT GEORGE G MEADE MD UNCLAS F O U O SUBJ/DOD CHECKLIST: C-UAS CAPABILITIES: MOBILE COVERED ASSETS WITHIN the U.S. Subject: GENADMIN: DoD Checklist for the Use of Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) Capabilities: Mobile Covered Assets Within the United States U//FOUO MSGID/GENADMIN/DJ-3// REF/A/Doc/ 10 USC 130i REF/B/Doc/ 18 USC 32 REF/C/Doc/ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3121.01B (18 Jun 2008) REF/D/Doc/ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3212.03A (8 Nov 2013) REF/E/Doc/ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3212.02D(31 Dec 2013) REF/F/Msg/ Deputy Secretary of Defense Policy Memorandum 16-003(18 Aug 2016) REF/G/Msg/ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Notice 3124(8 Feb 2017) REF/H/Msg/ Deputy Secretary of Defense Policy Memorandum 17-00X(5 Jul 2017) REF/I/Msq/ Office of the Secretary of Defense Public Affairs Guidance, Counter Unmanned Aircraft Policy (4 Aug 2017)  ${\tt REF/J/Msg/}$  JS J-3 Directorate GENADMIN Guidance to Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Within the United States (23 Feb 2018) REF/K/Msg/ JS J-3 Directorate GENADMIN Interim DoD Notification Requirement to the FAA of UAS/UA Engagements Within the U.S.(23 Mar 2018) REF/L/Msq/ JS J-3 Directorate GENADMIN Phone Number Update: DoD Notification to the FAA of UAS (20 Jul 2018) REF/M/Msg/ JS J-3 Directorate GENADMIN Update: DoD Reporting of UAS Incidents Worldwide (14 May 2018) REF/N/Doc/ NTIA Manual of Regulations and Procedures for Federal Radio Frequency Management (Red Book) paragraphs 7.14 and 7.25.3 (Sep REF/O/Doc/ NCR N&R CONOPS (18 May 2018) REF/P/Doc/ FAA/DoD J-SOP for UAS Specific SSI (7 Apr 2017)

AMHS 4.1.5.3 4.1.5.3 Page 3 of 5

REF/Q/Doc/ Shared FAA-Federal Partner Roadmap for FAA Support of Operational C-UAS Use under 130i and 2661 (10 Aug 2018) REF/R/Doc/ DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Nov 2018)

#### AMPN/(U)

REF A is Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 130i

REF B is Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 32

REF C is CJCSI, "Standing Rules of Engagement / Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces (U)"

REF D is CJCSM, "Performing Tests, Training, and Exercises Impacting the Global Positioning System (GPS)"

REF E is CJCSM, "Performing Electronic Attack in the U.S. and Canada for Tests, Training, and Exercises"

REF F is the Deputy Secretary of Defense Policy Memorandum 16-003, "Interim Guidance for Countering Unmanned Aircraft"

REF G is the CJCS Notice 3124, "Interim Guidance for Countering Unmanned Aircraft"

REF H is the Deputy Secretary Of Defense Policy Memorandum 17-00X, "Supplemental Guidance for Countering Unmanned Aircraft"

REF I is the OSD-Approved Counter-UAS Public Affairs Guidance to the Military Departments and Combatant Commands

REF J is the JS J-3 Directorate GENADMIN message, "Guidance to Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Within the United States" REF K is the JS J-3 Directorate GENADMIN message, "Interim DoD Notification Requirement to the FAA of UAS/UA Engagements Within the U.S."

REF L is the S J-3 Directorate GENADMIN message, "Phone Number Update: DoD Notification to the FAA of UAS"

REF M is the JS J-3 Directorate GENADMIN message, "Update: DoD Reporting of UAS Incidents Worldwide"

REF N is the NTIA Manual of Regulations and Procedures for Federal Radio Frequency Management

("Red Book") paragraphs 7.14 and 7.25.3

REF O is the National Capital Region C-UAS Notification and Reporting Concept of Operations

REF P is the FAA/DoD Joint Standard Operating Procedures for UAS Specific Special Security Instructions

REF Q is the Shared FAA-Federal Partner Roadmap for FAA Support of Operational C-UAS Use under  $130\mathrm{i}$  and 2661

REF R is the DoD dictionary which sets forth standard and approved DoD terminology  $\,$ 

#### NARR/(U)

#### GENTEXT/REMARKS/

#### 1. PURPOSE.

(U//FOUO) This checklist applies to all DoD mobile covered (as defined in References A and H) assets that a DoD Component (as defined in Reference R) plans to defend with C-UAS capabilities during transit, escort, and convoy movements and at temporary locations within the United States. It identifies the process through which the Military Departments approve the operational use of specific C-UAS capabilities in the defense of a mobile covered asset within the United States (including its territories, possessions, and territorial waters) in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 130i and Deputy Secretary of Defense Policy Memorandum 17-00X. The DoD mobile asset maintains its covered status during transit and while at temporary locations within the United States.

(U//FOUO) Consistent with prescribed objectives and requirements, particularly those of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), this checklist details the steps for the operational use of C-UAS capabilities to defend DoD mobile covered assets against a UAS threat. It also prescribes requirements to 1) mitigate impacts on the safety and efficiency of the National Airspace System (NAS); 2) minimize interference with other authorized users of the electromagnetic spectrum; and 3) reduce effects on the local environment. Military Departments, NORAD and the affected Combatant Commands (USSTRATCOM, USNORTHCOM, and USINDOPACOM) will incorporate the attached checklist into their respective guidance, as appropriate.

#### 2. BACKGROUND.

(U//FOUO) The Military Departments have provided amplifying/clarifying guidance consistent with existing Joint Staff J-3 guidance and these checklist requirements. Upon completion of these minimum checklist requirements, Military Departments have the authority and responsibility to approve operational use of C-UAS capabilities for mobile covered assets. Military Departments will coordinate with and inform the Military Departments' Spectrum Management Offices (SMOs), USSTRATCOM, USNORTHCOM, USINDOPACOM, NORAD, the Joint Staff, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security (ASD (HD&GS)) of the approval for the specific capability for operational use. Military Departments and the ASD (HD&GS) will maintain records of the completed checklists with all supporting documentation in the event of follow-on requests for information, including interagency requests for information.

#### 3. ADMINISTRATION.

- 3.A. (U) Joint Staff points of contact.
- 3.A.1. (U) Lt Col Orby Arreola/JS J36/comm: 703-695-1993/SIPR: orbelin.arreola.mil@mail.smil.mil/NIPR: orbelin.arreola.mil@mail.mil

#### 4. RELEASABILITY.

(U//FOUO) Distribution authorized to Department of Defense and U.S. DoD contractors only to protect information and technical data that provides insight into vulnerabilities of U.S. critical infrastructure, including DoD warfighting capabilities vital to national security that are otherwise not publicly available as determined on August 10, 2017. Other requests for this document shall be referred to Deputy Director, J36.

Attachment 1: DoD Checklist for the Use of C-UAS Capabilities: Mobile Covered Assets Within the United States (Including its Territories, Possessions, and Territorial Waters) v25 cao 14 Dec 18

BT #1239

#### NNNN

Received from AUTODIN 101352Z Jan 19

# Attachment 1

# DoD Checklist for the Use of Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) Capabilities: Mobile Covered Assets Within the United States (Including its Territories, Possessions, and Territorial Waters)

Military Department (MILDEP)	MOBILE COVERED ASSET	

DoD Component Task	Responsible DoD Component	Status	Guidance/Policy
1. Inform the ASD (HD&GS), USSTRATCOM, NORAD, USNORTHCOM, USINDOPACOM, and the Joint Staff of C-UAS equipment / system / capability planned for the defense of a mobile covered asset. Currently, the Military Departments accomplish this step through the FAA/DoD biweekly meetings.  Package submission includes: - C-UAS type and mode(s) of operation - C-UAS installation schedule / testing schedule - Proposed date ready for operational use	Military Department  DoD (non-MILDEP) Test Agency	☐ Complete ☐ Pending ☐ N/A	Military Service Guidance  DoD (non-MILDEP) Test Agency Guidance  Shared FAA-Federal Partner Roadmap for FAA Support of Operational C-UAS Use under § 130i and § 2661
1.a. Engage with the ASD (HD&GS), who will, in conjunction with the Policy Board on Federal Aviation (PBFA), coordinate with the FAA on potentially affected airspace and possible interference with local National Airspace System (NAS) safety equipment including navigation aids, radio communication systems, and surveillance radars. Currently, the Military Departments accomplish this sub-step through the FAA / DoD biweekly meetings as well. This task is complete upon obtaining acknowledgement / coordination from the FAA.	Military Department  DoD (non-MILDEP) Test Agency	☐ Complete ☐ Pending ☐ N/A	DoD (non-MILDEP) Test Agency Guidance  Shared FAA-Federal Partner Roadmap for FAA Support of Operational C-UAS Use under § 130i and § 2661

DoD Component Task	Responsible DoD Component	Status	Guidance/Policy
2. Perform system safety analysis and C-UAS weapon system legal review, as appropriate.	Military Department  DoD (non-MILDEP) Test Agency	☐ Comp ☐ Pendii ☐ N/A	Willitary Scrvice Galdanice
3. In accordance with timelines outlined in CJCSM 3212.02D and prior to operational use of C-UAS capability in the defense of a mobile covered asset, submit non-Global Positioning System (GPS) Electronic Attack (EA) requirements through the appropriate Area Frequency Coordinator office to the Military Department (MILDEP) Spectrum Management Offices (SMOs) to obtain test, train, and exercise authorization for all necessary spectrum / frequencies for C-UAS capabilities (tested once per mobile covered asset class / system, e.g., ship class, "standard" convoy configuration). If one combination of a C-UAS system and a ship class / convoy configuration is tested and approved, other assets in the same ship class or same convoy configuration should not have to be re-tested for that C-UAS system.  Auxiliary spectrum-dependent system support (e.g., radars / data link) will be submitted to / coordinated with the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA).  Note: Submit the EA Test & Training request with a broad enough "envelope" to cover the expected and reasonable frequency bandwidth and power (Effective Incident Radiated Power (EIRP)) ranges for a year.  - Within the request, specify the current spectrum requirements the system will actually be using as of the date of submission.	Military Department  DoD (non-MILDEP) Test Agency	□ Comp □ Pendii □ N/A	111/1/ Wallaci (Nea Book) paragraphs 7.11 a 7.25.5

DoD Component Task	Responsible DoD Component	Status	Guidance/Policy
3.a. In accordance with timelines outlined in CJCSM 3212.03A and prior to operational use of C- UAS capability in the defense of a mobile covered asset, submit GPS EA requirements to the appropriate Area Frequency Coordinator office to the MILDEP SMOs to obtain USSTRATCOM approval to test, train, and exercise the use of C- UAS capabilities affecting / possibly interfering with GPS frequencies, based on the operating parameters of proposed C-UAS equipment / system (tested once per mobile covered asset class/system, e.g., ship class, "standard" convoy configuration) If one combination of a C-UAS system and a ship class / convoy configuration is tested and approved, other assets in the same ship class or same convoy configuration should not have to be re-tested for that C-UAS system.	Military Department  DoD (non-MILDEP) Test Agency	☐ Complete ☐ Pending ☐ N/A	NTIA Manual (Red Book) paragraphs 7.14 & 7.25.3  CJCSM 3212.03A  DoD (non-MILDEP) Test Agency Guidance

DoD Component Task	Responsible DoD Component	Status	Guidance/Policy
<ul> <li>4. Develop C-UAS Concept of Operations (CONOPS) / Concept of Employment (CONEMP) and / or Command policies IAW existing DoD / MILDEP policies and directives (per mobile covered asset class / system, e.g., ship class, "standard" convoy configuration). At a minimum, CONOPS / CONEMP should include: <ul> <li>C-UAS incident response options</li> <li>Training development plansfor personnel using the systems, including certification and currency requirements</li> <li>Command and Control processes</li> <li>Notification and reporting procedures</li> <li>As appropriate, installation command, tenant unit command, and / or Joint Base command, OPCON/TACON Commander coordination measures</li> <li>Mitigation efforts of C-UAS spectrum effects to air traffic systems within the local area effects, as appropriate</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	Military Department  DoD (non-MILDEP) Test Agency	□ Complete □ Pending □ N/A	DSD PM 16-003  DSD PM 17-00X  CJCSN 3124  JS J3 GENADMIN Ops Guidance (23 Feb 18)  JS J3 GENADMIN Notification Guidance (23 Mar 18)  JS J3 GENADMIN Reporting Guidance (14 May 18)  Military Service Guidance  DoD (non-MILDEP) Test Agency Guidance  Shared FAA-Federal Partner Roadmap for FAA Support of Operational C-UAS Use under § 130i and § 2661
5. Perform C-UAS equipment / system functional testing, as appropriate, at the assigned main installation or temporary location in concert with local C-UAS CONOPS and CONEMP to estimate spectrum effects on air traffic systems within the local area, including the consideration of possible interference with local NAS safety equipment, including navigation aids, radio communication systems, and surveillance radars. If testing affects GPS frequencies, all actions must be accomplished IAW USSTRATCOM GPS test approval directions prescribed in Item 3.a.	Commander responsible for mobile covered asset  DoD (non-MILDEP) Test Agency	☐ Complete ☐ Pending ☐ N/A	JS J3 GENADMIN Ops Guidance (23 Feb 18)  NTIA Manual (Red Book) paragraphs 7.14 & 7.25.3  CJCSM 3212.03A  CJCSM 3212.02D  Military Service Guidance  DoD (non-MILDEP) Test Agency Guidance  Shared FAA-Federal Partner Roadmap for FAA Support of Operational C-UAS Use under § 130i and § 2661

DoD Component Task	Responsible DoD Component	Status	Guidance/Policy
6. Document consultations / coordination with Federal, State, territorial, tribal or local (FSTTL) law enforcement officials; community and public outreach efforts; and public affairs engagements, as appropriate, to establish and implement comprehensive C-UAS testing, training, exercise, operations, and incident response plans. The intent is to understand and reduce effects on the surrounding local environment and mitigate any degradation to other authorized equipment / systems in the vicinity of the mobile asset, as appropriate.	Commander responsible for mobile covered asset  DoD (non-MILDEP) Test Agency	☐ Complete ☐ Pending ☐ N/A	DSD PM 17-00X  Military Service Guidance  DoD (non-MILDEP) Test Agency Guidance
7. Provide all deliverables to the ASD (HD&GS) SharePoint page: <a href="https://intelshare.intelink.sgov.gov/sites/osdpolicy-cuas">https://intelshare.intelink.sgov.gov/sites/osdpolicy-cuas</a> Send email notification to the ASD (HD&GS) of submission. Specific instructions will be provided on the SharePoint page, including what deliverables to include. This will be considered the final package submission and will be accessible by ASD (HD&GS), CCMDs, NORAD, the Joint Staff, the Services and appropriate interagency partners. The Military Departments will maintain records of completed checklists with all supporting documentation in the event of any follow-on requests for information, including interagency requests for information.  Continued	Military Department  DoD (non-MILDEP) Test Agency	☐ Complete ☐ Pending ☐ N/A	Per ASD (HD&GS) Guidance  Military Service Guidance  DoD (non-MILDEP) Test Agency Guidance  Shared FAA-Federal Partner Roadmap for FAA Support of Operational C-UAS Use under § 130i and § 2661

DoD Component Task	Responsible DoD Component	Status	Guidance/Policy
7. continued			
Package submission will include:			
<ul> <li>CONOPS / CONEMP (at the appropriate classification level)</li> <li>C-UAS system type, number planned and modes of operation</li> <li>Radio Frequency (RF) EA parameters</li> <li>C-UAS generic / uninhibited "bugsplat" per GPS jamming system or per mobile covered asset class / system, e.g., ship class, "standard" convoy configuration</li> <li>Date ready for operational use</li> <li>Note: Any change to equipment configuration/capability that affects GPS Interference and Navigation Tool (GIANT)</li> <li>Reliability Prediction Model (RPM) modeling and simulation results (i.e. "bugsplats"); changes the RF parameters (such as frequencies, emission mask, transmitter bandwidth, effective isotropic radiated power (transmitter power, antenna gain, system / cable losses); or introduces new / different possible spectrum effects to air traffic systems within the local area effects requires resubmission of a full package. Firmware, hardware, or software updates that do not affect these parameters nor ntroduce new or different possible spectrum effects to air traffic systems do not need to be</li> </ul>			

DoD Component Task	Responsible DoD Component	Status	Guidance/Policy
8. Upon completion of tasks / requirements, the Military Department grants operational use authority for the mobile covered asset and informs MILDEP SMOs, USSTRATCOM, NORAD, USNORTHCOM, USINDOPACOM, the Joint Staff, and ASD (HD&GS).	Military Department  DoD (non-MILDEP) Test Agency	☐ Complete ☐ Pending ☐ N/A	Military Service Guidance  DoD (non-MILDEP) Test Agency Guidance  Shared FAA-Federal Partner Roadmap for FAA Support of Operational C-UAS Use under § 130i and § 2661

#### UNCLASS//FOUO

## **List of Acronyms**

ASD (HD&GS) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security

CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual

CJCSN Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Notice

C-UAS Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System

CONEMP Concept of Employment CONOPS Concept of Operations

DSD Deputy Secretary of Defense

EA Electronic Attack

EIRP Effective Isotropic Radiated Power
FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FCC Federal Communications Commission
GENADMIN General Administrative Message

GPS Global Positioning System

J-SOP Joint Standard Operating Procedure

MILDEP Military Department

NAS National Airspace System

NTIA National Telecommunications and Information Administration

PM Policy Memorandum

SMO Spectrum Management Office

RF Radio Frequency

UAS Unmanned Aircraft System

From: C3F BWC

To: VADM USN COMTHIRDFLT (USA)

Cc: (b) (6) CAPT USN COMNAVSURFPAC (USA); (b) (6) CAPT USN COMTHIRDFLT (USA)

b) (6) LCDR USN (USA)

Subject: FW: (U) Storyboard for UAS interaction on 15 JUL

Date: Tuesday, July 16, 2019 4:14:49 PM

Attachments: USS BUNKER HILL.VIR.UNK.UAS INTERACTION.150415ZJUL19.pptx

Admiral,

BLUF: BKH storyboard for UAS interaction from night of 14-15 July of 11xUAS.

Very Respectfully,

CDR (b) (6)

C3F Battle Watch Captain C3F\_BWC.FCT@navy.smil.mil

C3F\_BWC.FCT@navy.mil

Comm: (b) (6) VoSIP: (b) (6)

----Original Message----

From: TAO <tao@cg52.navy.smil.mil> Sent: Tuesday, July 16, 2019 3:25 PM

To: C3F\_BWC <C3F\_BWC.FCT@navy.smil.mil>

Cc: # XO < (b) (6) .navy.smil.mil>; (b) (6) CDR USN COMTHIRDFLT

(USA) <(b) (6) @navy.smil.mil>; (b) (6) LT BKH OPS

<(b) (6) @cg52.navy.smil.mil>

Subject: RE: (U) Storyboard for UAS interaction on 15 JUL

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

C3F BWC,

Attached is BKH's storyboard for UAS interaction from 15 July.

VR.

LT (b) (6)

Operations Officer

USS BUNKER HILL (CG 52)

----Original Message----

From: C3F\_BWC [mailto:C3F\_BWC.FCT@navy.smil.mil]

Sent: Tuesday, July 16, 2019 7:41 PM

To: # OPS; TAO

Cc: # XO; (b) (6) CDR USN COMTHIRDFLT (USA)

Subject: Storyboard for UAS interaction on 15 JUL

#### OPS/TAO,

During the UAS interaction on 15JUL your unit was tasked to develop a storyboard indicating the surface vessels within a 20 nm range from UAS sighting. Request you email storyboard to C3F BWC. Thank you in advance.

Very Respectfully,

LCDR (b) (6)
C3F Battle Watch Captain
C3F\_BWC.FCT@navy.smil.mil

C3F\_BWC.FCT@navy.mil


Comm: (b) (6) VoSIP: (b) (6)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED



# CYW.

# 15JUL19: BKH Interaction with Multiple U/I UAS




<u>CO Assessment</u>: (U) BKH gained visual of several Quadcopter style UAS off of our Port Bow. UAS operated in and around BKH position. Active during the event was a C3F VOI, M/V BASS STRAIT. BKH reached out via BTB in order to ascertain if the UAS originated from their vessel. Negative response. BUNKER HILL attempted to query the contact controller over Bridge to Bridge and received no response. After the departure of M/V BASS STRAIT UAS platforms were still active.

#### **UNCLASSIFIED**

## 25 JUL 19: USS Gabrielle Giffords Interaction With 4X UAV's

<u>BLUF</u>: GBG Operating 10NM S of San Clemente Island when 4 UAV's were identified proceeding inbound and orbiting around USS Gabrielle Giffords while conducting MQ8 Flight OPS. GBG Landed, refueled, and re-launched MQ-8 to investigate small UAS and try to determine small UAS point of origin. Three small boats were in the vicinity, One unidentified and one Identified as Prez Espada the other identified as R Donzi. No response to GBG query. PKN queried Prez Espada and they identified themselves as a small fishing vessel.



# **Timeline of Events**

- 25/0430Z JUL, USS GBG conducting MQ8 OPS when 4X UAV's were visually ID'd by OOD/JOOD.
- 25/0444Z JUL, Small UAS #1
  conducted an orbit around GBG. GBG
  conducted Query on what believed to
  be UAV homeplate.
- 25/0534Z JUL PKN conducted Query on Prez Espada and reported themselves as small fishing vessel.
- UNK fishing vessel vacated area to East. PKN was directed to follow and ID.
- 5. 25/0545Z JUL GBG has visual of 4 small UAV's. Contacts hovered and shadowed GBG's port and stbd bow.
- 6. 25/0745Z JUL GBG lost visual of 4X UAV's. MQ8 was launched after refuel from GBG to VID UAV's. MQ8 confirmed no visual on FLIR in the vicinity of GBG.

\*

Video/Photos capture point(s)

 From:
 CPF.CATBWC

 To:
 C3F\_BWC

Cc: (b) (6) LCDR USN COMTHIRDFLT (USA); Clauze, (b) (6) CDR USN COMTHIRDFLT (USA); (b) (6)

(6) CUR USN (USA); (b) (6) CAPT USN (USA); (b) (6) CAPT USN

COMTHIRDFLT (USA); (b) (6) LCDR USN (USA)

Subject: RE: (U) GBG UAS Interaction

Date: Thursday, July 25, 2019 2:31:42 AM

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

In receipt.

Will there be more reporting on this incident?

V/r,
LCDR(b) (6)
CPF Battle Watch Captain
COM(b) (6)
DSN(b) (6)
DRSN(b) (6)
cpf.catbwc.fct@navy.smil.mil

-----Original Message-----From: C3F\_BWC

Sent: Wednesday, July 24, 2019 10:37 PM

To: CPF.CATBWC < CPF.CATBWC.FCT@navy.smil.mil>

Subject: GBG UAS Interaction

CPF,

BLUF: GBG reported two UAS off their port bow 0431Z. PKN was close by and helped query ships in the area: PEZ Espada was close by, PNK queried them and they denied UAS operation. R DONZI was 1.5 nm away, did not respond to query but had three people topside with fishing poles. PKN was tracking an unknown fishing vessel traveling at 090 at 20 kts with intention to close to 1 nm for query.

At this time, C3F is awaiting official report and products from GBG.

Very Respectfully,

LCDR (b) (6)
C3F Battle Watch Captain
C3F\_BWC.FCT@navy.smil.mil
C3F\_BWC.FCT@navy.mil
Comm: (b) (6)
VoSIP: (b) (6)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

From: (b) (6) ISC DDG60

To: C3F BWC; C3F\_ABWC; C3F\_COPS; C3F\_FIWO; C3F\_FIWA; (b) (6) CDR\_USN\_COMTHIRDFLT

(USA); (b) (6) LT USN COMTHIRDFLT (USA); (b) (6) LT USN COMTHIRDFLT (USA); "CCSG9 N2@ccsg9.navy.smil.mil"; "CSG9 BWC@ccsg9.navy.smil.mil"; "CSG9 FIWO@ccsg9.navy.smil.mil"; "CSG9 FIWO@ccsg9.navy.smil

COMNAVSURFPAC SAN (USA); (b) (6) @cvn71.navy.smil.mil"; (b) (6) LT USN (USA); (b) (6)

(b) (6) CTT1 COMLCSRON ONE, N/

Cc: "CDS-23 STAO@cvn71.navy.smil.mil"; "CSG9 BWC@csq9.navy.smil.mil"; "CSG9 ABWC@csq9.navy.smil.mil";

CO; XO; PHM, TAO DDG60; OPS

Subject: USS PAUL HAMILTON/VIR/UNK/UAS/300930ZJUL19

 Date:
 Tuesday, July 30, 2019 7:10:20 AM

 Attachments:
 300930ZJUL,UAS,PHM.001,UNCLAS,ipg

300930ZJUL19.UAS.PHM.QUICKLOOK.UNCLAS1.pptx 300930ZJUL19.UAS.PHM.PAO.UNCLAS.docx

300930ZJUL19.UAS.PHM.001.UNCLAS.wmv

Importance: High

#### CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

1. (U) Attached is VI from USS PAUL HAMILTON. Amplifying information: Interaction with multiple UAS.

2. (U) Units involved: USS PAUL HAMILTON (DDG-60); UAS.

3. (U) Files attached: 01x PICTURES; 01x VIDEO; 01x PAO statement; 01x Quick-look Storyboard.

300930ZJUN19.UAS.PHM.001.UNCLAS.JPG

300930ZJUN19.UAS.PHM.PHM.001.UNLCAS.WMV

300930ZJUN19.UAS.PHM.PHM.PAO.UNCLAS.DOCX

300930ZJUN19.UAS.PHM.PHM.STORYBOARD.UNCLAS.PPTX

4. (U) USS PAUL HAMILTON is in international waters approximately 45NM E of San Clemente, CA.

5. (U) LATITUDE/LONGITUDE:3254361N 11928972W.

6. (U) DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT:

0930Z: Indications of UAS and VID from technical means.

1230Z: UNK vessel and UAS out of sight. SNOOPIE Team is secured.

Ambient temp: 64 degrees Fahrenheit

Winds: NW 15-20 Sea State: 2-3 foot waves

Visibility: UNR

V/r.

PHM SNOOPIE TEAM



At approximately 0930Z on 30 JULY 2019, multiple UAS sighted around, overhead and following the USS PAUL HAMILTON while it was conducting routine operations in international waters in the Pacific Ocean, getting within 200 yards in altitude of the USS PAUL HAMILTON's bow.

During the incident, multiple UAS were observed by visual and technical means operating within 200 yards of the USS PAUL HAMILTON. The UAS were following and making passes overhead. The UAS's original origin is unknown.

We consider the UAS's actions during this observation were not in accordance with the internationally recognized COLREGs "rules of the road" nor internationally recognized maritime customs, creating a risk for collision."

U.S. Navy ships and aircraft operate throughout the Indo-Pacific, including in Southern California waters. As we have for decades, our forces will continue to fly, sail and operate anywhere international law allows. We expect all regional navies and the forces under their control to behave safely and professionally at all times. On rare occasions when interactions are unsafe and/or unprofessional, we have mechanisms to examine those incidents.



## **UNCLASSIFIED**

# INITIAL REPORT: 30 JUL 19: USS PAUL HAMILTON OBSERVES UAS



<u>BLUF</u>: (U) USS PAUL HAMILTON (PHM) conducting routine operations in the SOCAL OPAREA observes multiple UAS activity. Closest CPA, 200 YDS vertical off PHM's bow.

#### USS PHM UAS






# **WEATHER**

Ambient temp: 64 Winds: NW 15-20 Sea State: 2-4ft Visibility: UNR

(U) UAS Via PHM SNOOPIE TEAM



#### CPA 200 YDS vertical



#### **Timeline of Events**

- 1. 0930Z: Indications of UAS and VID from technical means.
- 1. 1230Z: UNK vessel and UAS out of sight. SNOOPIE Team is secured.

Current as of 300930ZJUL19

From: (b) (6) LT USN, USS RUSSELL

To: <u>C3F\_BWC</u>; C3F\_ABWC; <u>C3F\_COPS</u>; <u>C3F\_FIWC</u>; <u>C3F\_FIWA</u>; (b) (6) <u>CDR\_USN\_COMTHIRDFLT</u>

(USA); (b) (6) LCDR USN COMTHIRDFLT (USA); (b) (6) LI USN COMTHIRDFLT (USA); "CCSG9 N2@ccsg9.navy.smil.mil"; "CSG9 BWC@ccsg9.navy.smil.mil"; "CSG9 FIWO@ccsg9.navy.smil.mil"; "CSG9 FIWA@ccsg9.navy.smil.mil"; "(b) (6) USN

COMNAVSURFPAC SAN (USA); (b) (6) @cvn71.navy.smil.mil"; (b) (6) LT USN (USA); (b) (6)

(b) (6) COMLCSRON ONE, N/

Cc: (b) (6) CDR USN, USS RUSSELL; (b) (6) LT USN, USS RUSSELL; (b) (6) ENS USN, USS

USSELL DDG 59; (b) (6) CTTC USN, USS RUSSELL; (b) (6) ENS USN, USS RUSSELL;

ÚSN, USS RUSSELL (DDG-59); TAO

Subject: USS RUSSELL/VIR/UNK/INTERACTION WITH UAS/300757ZJUL19

Date: Tuesday, July 30, 2019 5:07:05 AM

Attachments: CPF VI Quickdraw Storyboard 300757ZJUL2019 UNCLASS.pptx

300757ZJUL19.INTERACTION WITH UAS.RSL.001.UNCLASS.JPG 300757ZJUL19.INTERACTION WITH UAS.RSL.001.UNCLASS.wmv 300757ZJUL19.INTERACTION WITH UAS.RSL.002.UNCLASS.JPG 300757ZJUL19.INTERACTION WITH UAS.RSL.003.UNCLASS.JPG

PA Statement 300757ZJUL2019.UNCLASS.docx

1. (U) Attached IS VI from USS RUSSELL.

- 2. (U) Units involved: USS RUSSELL, USS KIDD, UNK Pleasure Craft, 5x UNK UAS
- 3. (U) Files attached: 03x .JPG, 01x .WMV, 1x PAO Statement, 1x VI Storyboard
- 4. (U) Ship name and geographic reference: USS RUSSELL is located in SOCAL OPAREA approximately 7.5 NM south San Nicolas Island.
- 5. (U) 3258N 11906W (Narration incorrectly states position as 32 588N)
- 6. (U) DESCRIPTION OF EVENT: At 0757Z, while operating in SOCAL on CSE 075 T at 15 kts, RSL reports 1x possible UAS with GREEN/WHITE/RED lights off stern from RSL. At 0811Z, RSL reports UAS flyover, called away SNOOPIE team and DRAKE. RSL changed CSE to 130 T. RSL then lost visual of UAS. At 0937Z, RSL reports 1 x possible UAS with GREEN/WHITE/RED lights flying stationary relative to RSL. CPA was 4000 yards. 1 UNKNOWN vessel was identified operating in the vicinity of Santa Catalina Island. RSL changed CSE to 035 T to pursue UAS as directed by GZ. KID was moving on opposite course to RSL and reported no visual of UAS. 3 x possible UAS were reported and visual was gained off the STBD side of RSL. Pleasure craft with unidentified MMSI was hailed on BTB using UAS warning script. At 1015Z, RSL slowed to 10 knots. Pleasure craft with unidentified MMSI was again hailed on BTB using UAS warning script. Communications were never established. RSL still had visual of UAS which appeared outbound. At 1110Z, RSL no longer has visual on green/red/white lights. SNOOPIE team and DRAKE team were secured.

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED










# 30JUL19: INITIAL REPORT USS RUSSELL INTERACTION WITH UAS



<u>BLUF</u>: (U) RSL reported 2 groupings of FLASHING WHITE/RED/GREEN lights while conducting routine operations in the SOCAL OPAREA. 1 UNKNOWN vessel was observed operating in the vicinity, identified as PLEASURE CRAFT MMSI 003669184. BRIDGE TO BRIDGE communications were not established but attempted by RSL. DRAKE UAS detection system was not employed by RSL.



# **Timeline of Events**

- 1. <u>0757Z</u>: While operating in SOCAL on CSE 075 T at 15 kts, RSL reports 1x possible UAS with GREEN/WHITE/RED lights off stern from RSL.
- 2. <u>0811Z</u>: RSL reports UAS flyover, called away SNOOPIE team and DRAKE. RSL changed CSE to 130 T. RSL then lost visual of UAS.
- 3. <u>0937Z</u>: RSL reports 1 x possible UAS with GREEN/WHITE/RED lights flying stationary relative to RSL. CPA was 4000 yards. 1 UNKNOWN vessel was identified operating in the vicinity of Santa Catalina Island. RSL changed CSE to 035 T to pursue UAS as directed by GZ.. KID was moving on opposite course to RSL and reported no visual of UAS. 3 x possible UAS were reported and visual was gained off the STBD side of RSL. Pleasure craft with unidentified MMSI was hailed on BTB using UAS warning script.
- 1015Z: RSL slowed to 10 knots. Pleasure craft with unidentified MMSI was hailed on BTB using UAS warning script. RSL still had visual of UAS which appeared outbound. Communications were never established.
- 5. <u>1110Z</u>: RSL no longer has visual on green/red/white lights. SNOOPIE team and DRAKE team secured.

Report Prepared: RSL SNOOPIE TEAM Current as of 301110Z JUL 2019 At approximately 0757Z on 30 July, 2019, 5 unknown UAS's made an approach of USS RUSSELL while it was conducting routine operations in international waters in the SOCAL OPAREA.

During the incident, while operating in SOCAL, USS RUSSELL reports 1x possible UAS with GREEN/WHITE/RED lights off the stern of USS RUSSELL. USS RUSSELL reports UAS flyover, called away SNOOPIE team and DRAKE. USS RUSSELL then lost visual of that UAS. USS RUSSELL reports 1x more possible UAS with GREEN/WHITE/RED lights flying stationary relative to USS RUSSELL; CPA with that UAS was 4000 yards. 1 UNKNOWN vessel was identified operating in the vicinity of Santa Catalina Island. USS RUSSELL changed course to pursue UAS as directed by GZ. USS KIDD was moving on an opposite course to USS RUSSELL and reported no visual of UAS. 3x more possible UAS were reported and visual was gained off the STBD side of USS RUSSELL. Pleasure craft with unidentified MMSI was hailed on BTB using UAS warning script. Pleasure craft with unidentified MMSI was hailed again on BTB using UAS warning script. Communications were never established. USS RUSSELL still had visual of UAS which appeared outbound. Eventually, USS RUSSELL no longer had visual on green/red/white lights.

U.S. Navy ships and aircraft operate throughout the Indo-Pacific routinely, including in the SOCAL OPAREA. As we have for decades, our forces will continue to fly, sail and operate anywhere international law allows. We expect all regional navies and the forces under their control to behave safely and professionally at all times. On rare occasions when interactions are unsafe and/or unprofessional, we have mechanisms to examine those incidents.

 From:
 (b) (6)
 OS1, RJN

 To:
 C3F BWC; C3F ABWC

Cc: (b) (6) CDR, RJN CO; (b) (6) CDR, RJN XO; TAO; (b) (6) LT, RJN CSO; (b) (6) (b) (6) LT, RJN IWO; (b) (6) CTRC, RJN; (b) (6) IST, RJN; (b) (6) LT USN

COMDESKON 9 (USA); (b) (6) CAPT USN COMDESKON 9 (USA); (b) (6) CAPT USN

COMDESRON 9 (USA)

Subject: USSRALPHJOHNSON/VIR/UNK/UAS/150345ZJUL2019.

Date: Sunday, July 14, 2019 11:23:38 PM
Attachments: 15JUL19 PUBLIC AFFAIRS STATEMENT.txt

150345ZJUL19.UAS.RJN.001.UNCLASSIFIED.jpg 150345ZJUL19.UAS.RJN.001.UNCLASSIFIED.wmv USSRALPHJOHNSON.VIR.UNK.UAS.150345ZJUL19.PPTX


#### ALCON,

Please find RJN's initial VI from RJN's first UAS interaction this evening. We may have more detailed track information in our recorded SPY data, but that will take time to fully analyze. There was a pause in UAS activity after this event, and then a second event began (which is still ongoing). That second event will be covered in a SEPCOR VI submission.

No C-UAS action was taken for this event. RJN is not equipped with DRAKE or other C-UAS equipment. The ship set RIVER CITY 1 during this event. I continued to transit along PIM in normal state, no evasive steering, and AIS transmitting.

V/R,\_

CDR (b) (6)



USS RALPH JOHNSON (DDG 114)

ВТ

- (U) ATTACHED IS VI FROM USS RALPH JOHNSON.
- (U) CHARACTERIZATION: UNKNOWN UAS INTERACTION ASSESSED AS SAFE AND PROFESSIONAL.
- (U) UNITS INVOLVED: USS RALPH JOHNSON, 3-4 UNK UAS
- (U) FILES ATTACHED:

150345ZJUL19.UAS.RJN.001.UNCLASSIFIED.JPG 150345ZJUL19.UAS.RJN.001.UNCLASSIFIED.WMV USSRALPHJOHNSON.VIR.UNK.UAS.150345ZJUL19.PPTX

15JUL19 PUBLIC AFFAIRS STATEMENT.TXT

- (U) SHIP NAME: USS RALPH JOHNSON (DDG 114)
- (U) GEOGRAPHIC REFERENCE: PACIFIC OCEAN, APPROXIMATELY 91NM W OF LOS ANGELES, CA, USA.
- (U) LATITUDE/LONGITUDE: 3433N 12234W
- (U) SCHEME OF MANEUVER:

RJN: 148T @18KTS CONDUCTING OPEN OCEAN TRANSIT.

- UNK UAS': APPROXIMATELY 150T, THEN 090T; TRACKED SPEEDS FROM 9KTS TO 120KTS.
- (U) DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT: RJN WAS CONDUCTING A ROUTINE OPEN OCEAN TRANSIT

ON COURSE 148T, 18KTS. ON 15JUL19 AT 0238Z RJN FIRST OBSERVED INDICATIONS OF POSSIBLE UAS ACTIVITY VIA RADAR OFF THE PORT BEAM. AT 0320Z, A SECOND UNKNOWN UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEM (UAS) WAS OBSERVED VIA EOSS AT 5NM APPROACHING USS RALPH JOHNSON FROM THE PORT SIDE, THEN MOVED AWAY FROM RJN TO THE EAST. FIRM RADAR TRACKS ON TWO ADDITIONAL UAS SHOWED A SIMILAR ROUTE COMING PROGRESSIVELY CLOSER TO RJN BEFORE MOVING AWAY TO THE EAST. EOSS VIDEO ACHIEVED ON SECOND UAS. LOOKOUTS OBSERVED FLASHING LIGHTS FROM AS MANY AS TEN ADDITIONAL CONTACTS TO THE NORTHEAST AND EAST OF RJN, BUT NO FIRM RADAR TRACKS AND NO POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION AS UAS. INTERACTION IS CHARACTERIZED AS SAFE AND PROFESSIONAL.

(U) CPA: 8000YDS.

(U) WEAPONS CONDITIONS:

RJN: WEAPONS POSTURE N/A (CONDITION III).


(U) WEATHER CONDITIONS: 65F


(U) VISIBILITY: 4-5NM (TWILIGHT)

(U) SEA STATE: 1-3FT

#### UNCLASSIFIED

# 15JUL 19: RJN Interaction with UNK UAS





Double-

At approximately 0320Z on 15 JUL 2019, multiple unmanned aerial system (UAS) made a safe and professional approach of USS RALPH JOHNSON while conducting routine operations in international waters of the coast of Southern California, getting within 8000 yards.

During the incident the UAS made no communication attempts while it approached. The first UAS approached from port side and paralleled USS RALPH JOHNSON from a distance of approximately 8000 yards off the port side before moving away to the east. Two additional UAS also approached USS RALPH JOHNSON from the north and followed a similar track and distance off the port side of the USS RALPH JOHNSON.

We consider the UAS' actions during this interaction as safe and professional and they were in accordance with the internationally recognized COLREGs "rules of the road" and internationally recognized maritime customs.

U.S. Navy ships and aircraft operate throughout the Indo-Pacific routinely, including in the Pacific Ocean. As we have for decades, our forces will continue to fly, sail and operate anywhere international law allows. We expect all regional navies and the forces under their control to behave safely and professionally at all times. On rare occasions when interactions are unsafe and/or unprofessional, we have mechanisms to examine those incidents.

From: (b) (6) LT USN, USS RUSSELL

To: <u>C3F\_BWC</u>; C3F\_ABWC; <u>C3F\_COPS</u>; <u>C3F\_FIWC</u>; <u>C3F\_FIWA</u>; (b) (6) <u>CDR\_USN\_COMTHIRDFLT</u>

(USA); (b) (6) LCDR USN COMTHIRDFLT (USA); (b) (6) LT USN COMTHIRDFLT (USA); (CCSG9 N2@ccsg9.navy.smil.mil"; "CSG9 BWC@ccsg9.navy.smil.mil"; "CSG9 FIWO@ccsg9.navy.smil.mil"; "CSG9 FIWO@ccsg9.navy.smil.mil"; "CSG9 FIWO@ccsg9.navy.smil.mil"; "(b) (6) @ddq115.navy.smil.mil"; (b) (6) LT USN (USA); (b) (6) CTT1 COMLCSRON

ONE. N/

Cc: (b) (6) CDR USN, USS RUSSELL; (b) (6) LT USN, USS RUSSELL; (b) (6) ENS USN, USS

USN, USS RUSSELL; (b) (6) ENS USN, USS RUSSELL;

ENS USN, USS RUSSELL (DDG-59); TAO

Subject: USSRUSSELL/VIR/UNK/INTERACTION WITH UAS/170411ZJUL19

Date: Tuesday, July 16, 2019 11:24:20 PM

Attachments: 170411ZJUL19.INTERACTION WITH UNK UAS.RSL.001.UNCLASS.JPG

170411ZJUL19.INTERACTION WITH UNK UAS.RSL.001.UNCLASS.wmv 170411ZJUL19.INTERACTION WITH UNK UAS.RSL.002.UNCLASS.JPG 170411ZJUL19.INTERACTION WITH UNK UAS.RSL.003.UNCLASS.JPG CPF VI Quickdraw Storyboard 170411ZJUL2019 UNCLASS.pptx

PA Statement 170411ZJUL2019.UNCLASS.docx

1. (U) Attached IS VI from USS RUSSELL.

- 2. (U) Units involved: USS RUSSELL, 3x UNK UAS
- 3. (U) Files attached: 03x .JPG, 01x .WMV, 1x PAO Statement, 1x VI Storyboard
- 4. (U) Ship name and geographic reference: USS RUSSELL is located in SOCAL OPAREA approximately 62NM SW of San Nicolas Island.
- 5. (U) 3217N 11958W
- 6. (U) DESCRIPTION OF EVENT: AT 0411Z while conducting routine operations in the SOCAL OPAREA on course 130T and speed 5KTS, RSL lookouts gained visual of 1 UAS at 259T, 1NM, 700 ft in alt. moving inbound RSL. White, red and green flashing lights observed. Type of UAS was not distinguishable by eye. No ES observed and UAS was not held by SPY. At 0417Z an second UAS visually identified (VID) at 090T, .2NM, 1000ft in alt hovering and matching RSL course and speed. The UAS originally identified continued to hover to the STBD of RSL and was not held by SPY. At 0420Z RSL turns to course 270T speed 5 knots and a third UAS was VID at 190T, 1 NM, 1000 ft in alt. At 0424Z UNK UAS 2 and 3 hovered off of RSL's PORT side. At 0440Z UNK UAS passes over RSL and continues to hover at 090T, 0 NM, 700 ft in alt. CPA was 700 ft over the fantail of RSL. At 0455Z UNK UAS appear to head outbound RSL and at 0515Z no further interaction with UNK UAS observed. No weapons were observed. No impact to RSL's mission.










# 17 JUL 19: DDG 59 Interaction with 3 UNK UAS at Sea



<u>BLUF</u>: USS RUSSELL (RSL) conducting routine operations in the SOCAL OPAREA, approximately 62 NM South West of San Nicolas Island. No weapons observed. No impact to RSL's mission.



#### Timeline of Events

- 0411Z while conducting routine operations in the SOCAL OPAREA on course 130T and speed 5KTS, RSL lookouts gained visual of 1 UAS at 259T, 1NM, 700 ft in alt. moving inbound RSL. White, red and green flashing lights observed. Type of UAS was not distinguishable by eye. No ES observed.
- 0417Z UAS visually identified (VID) at 090T, .2NM, 1000ft in alt hovering and matching RSL course and speed. UAS originally identified continued to hover to the STBD of RSL.
- 0420Z RSL turns to course 270T speed 5 knots. UAS VID at 190T, 1 NM, 1000 ft in alt.
- 0424Z UNK UAS 2 and 3 hovered off of RSL's PORT side.
- 0440Z UNK UAS 3 passes over RSL and continues to hover at 090T, 0 NM, 700 ft in alt. CPA was 700 ft over the fantail of RSL.
- 6. 0455Z UNK UAS appear to head outbound RSL.
- 0515Z No further interaction with UNK UAS observed.

★Video/Photos capture point(s)

Current as of 170515Z JUL 2019

At approximately 0411Z on 17 July, 2019, 3 unknown UAS made an approach of USS RUSSELL while it was conducting routine operations in international waters in the SOCAL OPAREA.

During the incident, while conducting routine operations in the SOCAL OPAREA, USS RUSSELL gained visual of a 3 unknown UAS flying in the vicinity of the ship. USS RUSSELL changed course and the UAS continued to fly in close proximity of the ship and matched the course and speed of RUSSELL. One UAS flew over top of the RSL and hovered approximately 700 feet off of the stern of the ship. The 3 unknown UAS then flew outbound.

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